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ABSTRACT
The basic idea explaining the relationship between economic growth and
income distribution is the “U- shaped hypothesis” postulated by Simon
Kuznets. This can be shown in a dual-economy model with technical
progress. Initially, inequality is low, but as labour participation in the
modern sector increases, higher wages in this sector tend to increase
inequality. However, if enough labour is incorporated in the modern
sector, wage inequality begins to diminish. Income inequality continues to
worsen between the two sectors, if a new modern economy (e.g. IT-based
technical change) is introduced and potential GDP shifts to a new
trajectory before the turning point is reached. In a globalised word, the
substantial unskilled-labour-saving technical progress puts pressure on
wages of unskilled workers (in industrialized countries). Also, globalization
may be blamed for leaving many nations and millions of people out from
reaping the benefits of globalization. This problem can only be overcome
by appropriate reforms of the international economic system.
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RESUMEN
La idea básica que explica la relación entre crecimiento económico y distribu-
ción del ingreso es la “hipótesis en forma de U” postulada por Simon
Kuznets. Esta puede surgir en una economía dual con progreso técnico.
Inicialmente, la desigualdad es baja, pero mientras la participación del
trabajo en el sector moderno sube, mayores salarios en este sector
favorecen un incremento de la desigualdad. Sin embargo, si suficiente trabajo
se incorpora al sector moderno, la desigualdad salarial comienza a dis-
minuir. La desigualdad de ingresos continúa deteriorándose entre los dos
sectores, si un nuevo sector moderno (p.e. el cambio técnico basado en la
informática) es introducido y el PBI potencial se mueve hacia una nueva
trayectoria antes que el momento decisivo es alcanzado. En un mundo glo-
balizado, el substancial ahorro de trabajo no calificado debido al progreso
técnico ejerce presión sobre los salarios de los trabajadores no calificados
(en los países industrializados). También, la globalización puede ser
culpada por dejar a muchas naciones y millones de personas fuera de los
beneficios de la misma. Este problema solo puede ser resuelto por las
reformas apropiadas del sistema económico mundial.
Palabras Clave: Crecimiento Económico, Distribución del Ingreso,
Globalización
Clasificación JEL: D31, O11.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that the rate of economic growth and
the degree of equality (or inequality) in the distribution of incomes and
wealth are not independent. Indeed, it seems plausible that the two are
mutually interdependent: growth rates affect distribution, and the distribution
affects growth. One of the most popular hypotheses with respect to this
interrelationship is Simon Kuznets’ more than half a century old “u-shaped
hypothesis” (1955). It postulates that income inequality first increases and
then decreases during the development or growth process.
Although extensively tested and empirically confirmed, the
hypothesis is missing a rigorous explanation. Kuznets’ own argument was
based in particular on the inter-sectoral transition from agriculture to
industry. In his own words, it is caused by “a shift away from agriculture,
a process usually referred to as industrialization and urbanization”
(Kuznets 1955, p. 7). His particular case was the transition from egalitarian
agriculture to a mixed industrial economy, followed by the decline of the
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share of the rural population and the democratization of industry, combined
with modern industrial relations and the rise of the welfare state.
In the following, the Kuznets’ hypothesis is shown to follow from
a simple two goods two sector model of economic growth based on the
Harris-Todaro (1970) migration model. In the third section, technological
change in the modern sector is incorporated, showing that the Kuznets’
hypotheses may be disturbed. However, the “new growth theory” introduced
in the fourth section allows to take into account also political solutions. A
macroeconomic or global view closes the arguments.   
II. A SIMPLE MODEL TO CAPTURE KUZNETS’ HYPOTHESIS
As a starting point, a simple Harrod - Domar growth model is
used. The idea behind is that, as discussed in the earlier literature, labour
and capital are rather complements within the same technology1 than
substitutes. Furthermore, in much of the history, growth has been more
constrained by the lack of capital than by a shortage of labour.2
Denoting by Qi the two outputs, by Ki capital stock in the two
sectors, and by bi the capital productivity or by its inverse 1/bi the
incremental capital – output ratio (ICOR), and by Li the labour employed in
each sector (i = A, M), the two sector two goods model reads as follows:
• Traditional Sector
QA = bA.KA and  KA/LA = CA
• Modern Sector
QM = bM.KM and  KM/LM = CM,
where the capital/labour ratio will be fixed in every sector.
• Price of the traditional good
PA = PM (Q/LA/Q/LM),
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1. We can here argue also along very modern lines developed by Aghion and Howitt (1998,
chapter 8), taking up the idea of a “general purpose technology” (GPT) that affects the entire
economic system.
2. Cf. the influential papers by Arthur W. Lewis about economic development with unlimited
supplies of labour; cf. e. g. Lewis (1954).
The price of the traditional good is a function of the ratio of the
per capita income in the traditional sector to that of the modern sector
times the price of the modern sector. In other words, the relative prices are
a function of the relative demands.3 This hypothesis also reflects the
stylized fact that high per capita income countries produce modern goods
which command higher prices on the world market, while poor countries
produce mainly raw or traditional goods.
• The real wage in each sector
wA =  PA.CA/ICORA= PAQA/LA
and
wM = PM.CM/ICORM = PMQM/LM ,
which equal, as shown, the respective marginal revenue products.
Furthermore, 
LT = LA + LM
with LT as total labour force. Disguised unemployment can exist,
but only in the traditional sector4.
As long as the modern sector wage is higher than the traditional
sector wage there will be migration from the traditional to the modern sec-
tor (cf. Harris and Todaro, 1970).
• The Gini coefficient
Defining by
SA = wA.LA/ (wALA + wM.LM ) the share of total income flowing to
the traditional sector, the Gini coefficient is then given by
G = 1 – (2 area)
where area = (SALT + LM )/ 2LT.
This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Since the wages are fixed in each sector, the area in Figure 1 is ½
if the entire labour force is in either of the two sectors of the economy
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3. An alternative formulation uses the income elasticities of demand for good A and M.
4. An interesting enlargement of the model could be in the direction of Bulow and Summers
(1986), where an informal sector is introduced which is necessary to migrate through before one
can apply for a job in the primary sector. This three sector model could then be used to explain the
large informal sector of most developing countries.
(what makes it a one-sector economy). Hence, the Gini coefficient will be
zero in both cases. During the migration process, the Gini coefficient will
increase, reaching a maximum, and then decrease as more and more labour
moves out of the traditional sector. This can be summarized in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: Given the assumption about technology, the migration of
labour from the traditional sector to the modern sector increases first the
inequality, reaches a turning point and begins to improve as the tradi-
tional sector diminishes and marginal productivity in that sector raises
wages on a par with the modern sector!
The inequality depends during the transition process on the distance
of the relative wages in the two sectors.
Figure 1
Labour and income distribution during transition process
III. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE MODERN SECTOR
With a more sophisticated dual economy model, it is possible to
show that there may exist three different equilibria5, e. g. by introducing
increasing returns due to technological progress into the modern sector.
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5. Cf. e. g. Kylymnyuk, Maliar and Maliar (2007).
One equilibrium may be where the economy produces only the
primitive good and converges to a low-income steady state. In other
words, the movement from the traditional sector is (too) slow, and the Gini
coefficient is (or becomes) fixed. As explained in the earlier literature, this
can happen if not enough investment (or savings) can be generated to
absorb the new entrants into the modern sector. The economy remains
eventually technologically stagnant.6
A second possibility is that the country produces both the traditional
and the modern, more sophisticated good, and converges to a medium-sized
economy. Or it may specialize in the production of the modern good and
then converges to a balanced growth path along Harrod - Kaldorian lines,
where technological progress is incorporated.
A third possibility is that a new modern sector may be introduced
at some point in time before the transition process is completed and the
total labour force is integrated into the current modern sector.7 Income
inequality will continue to worsen between the two sectors. In a certain
sense, there may be countries characterized by frequent innovations in
GPT (as e. g. IT-based technical change) and a high demand for higher-
level skills (like Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) which
tend to have higher inequality.8 In other words, the process of equalization
predicted by the Kuznets’ hypothesis is interrupted. As Conceiçao and
Galbraith (2001, p. 140) remark, “(t)he perhaps surprising fact is that
technology, which had been credited for driving growth and prosperity,
came equally to be blamed for this observed increase in inequality (italics
added, R.E.) in developed countries”.
Two sources could be mentioned which underline this general picture.
Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005, p. 20) state that “gross earnings
inequality has increased on average in OECD countries … This occurred
in countries where labour market performance improved considerably …,
as well as in countries where it deteriorated …”. According to the widely-cited
survey of Katz and Author (1999, p. 1465), “overall wage inequality and
educational wage differentials have expanded greatly in the United States
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6. In this case, FDI or a stimulating internal investment via e.g. an incomes policy or
redistribution policy can help to overcome this problem. Maybe this idea is also behind the
“pro-poor growth” movement; cf. e. g. Menkhoff (2006).
7. This possibility is mentioned by Campano and Salvatore (1998).
8. This is discussed in Conceiçao and Galbraith (2001); cf. their Figure 7.3 on p. 157.
and the United Kingdom since the end of the 1970s …  More modest
increases in overall wage inequality and skill differentials in the 1980s and
1990s are apparent in most other OECD countries”.
However, this general picture is in accordance with some of the
modern literature fairly summarized by Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-
Penalosa (1999). They ask two different questions: First, they ask whether
inequality is always good for growth; secondly, they ask whether growth
does increase earnings inequality. With respect to this second question,
they remark, that “recent empirical studies have pointed to a substantial
increase in earnings inequality in several OECD countries during the
past twenty years” (ibid, p. 1632/3). These changes, they note, can be
decomposed into three main elements: (1) an increase in educational wage
differentials; (2) an increase in age-related wage differentials; and (3) an
increase in within - group wage inequality.
In order, however, to explain earnings patterns and their change,
it is necessary to understand the behaviour of supply and demand for
different kinds of labour. As Jan Tinbergen (1975) pointed out, observed
relative wages are the outcome of a “race” between the forces increasing
the supply of skills (mainly education, but also experience) and those
increasing the demand for skills required by firms (technological change).
Tinbergen stated that “in the past seventy years that race was won by
education” (1975, p. 103) thus resulting in falling relative wages.
However, recent trends (and Tinbergen’s own extrapolation for the
1990ies) indicate that there has been an acceleration of the relative demand
for skills increasing the skill premium. This can be shown with the help of
a simple supply and demand diagram (cf. Figure 2).
In the short-run supply is fixed, in the long-run the supply curve is
horizontal where everybody has chosen to take education. Tinbergen’s
race can now be illustrated by shifts in demand and supply: if demand is
more important (as shown in Figure 2) –i.e. technology is winning– then
the relative wage of the skilled labour rises.9
And here, two factors can be made responsible for this acceleration
(cf. Adrian Wood, 1998): The impact of trade with the rapidly growing
economies in East Asia, and skill-biased technical progress.
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9. However, there exists also another explanation: The rising inequality may also be “due to
an increase in the effective supply of low-skilled workers, through immigration or trade, driving
down the wage”, as Galbraith (2001, p. 6) has remarked. 
Figure 2
Relative supply and demand for skilled/unskilled labour
Source: Based on Johnson (1997, p. 44).
IV. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION: TRADE AND/OR TECHNICAL
CHANGE
An interesting effect of globalization is the mentioned increasing
gap between low-wage earners and high-wage earners (also in the same
country or between countries). Without going here into the details, a
growing (empirical) literature tries to sort out the impact of trade and/or
skill - biased technological change on the observed rise of the skill
premium. While opening trade between two countries, the different factor
proportions (either between labour and capital or between low-skilled and
high-skilled labour) change importance and with this the relative prices of
the factors. This is the most important result of the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Stolper-Samuelson (HOSS) model. 
Even when some claim that trade is responsible only for a small
part of this change in wage inequality, taking into account the role of
imports as intermediate production factors then we can account for the
steady rise in wage inequality across educational groups. The (larger) part
40 ROLAND EISEN
of this increase in the skill-premium, however, should be explained by
technical progress on two different lines: Firstly, the acceleration in the
diffusion of new technologies can lead to increasing wage inequality
across skill groups (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1998, chapter 8). Since about
60 percent of the increase in wage inequality over the past twenty years is
within groups of individuals with the same educational level and the same
experience, we need still another theory. Therefore, secondly, learning-
by-doing and intersectoral mobility can be used to explain the increased
wage inequality within educational groups (cf. e. g. Aghion, Howitt and
Violante, 1998). 
Given this view, skill-biased technical change and trade liberalization
end up being complementary with the trade effect being carried over by
technical change, as Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999, p. 1653)
remark. This then can be summarized in Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2: The effects of biased technical change on earnings inequality
are “nonlinear”: on the one hand, the acceleration in the diffusion of new
technologies increases the skill premium until the new technology is
applied in all sectors (and the supply of skilled labour keeps increasing
because of education and experience). On the other hand, learning-by-
doing and the transferability of knowledge through intersectoral mobility
increase the within-cohort inequality until every worker has had some
experience with the new technology. As summarized by Aghion, Caroli and
Garcia-Penarosa (1999, p. 1655): “These two mechanisms thus tend to
generate a kind of alternative Kuznets curve (added, R.E.), with
inequality first rising and then falling … during the transition to a new
technological paradigm”.
However, if technical progress is the crucial source of inequality
whenever it is not neutral, that is, if it affects differently the productivity of
the various types of labour, then the questions may be posed, when the
skill-biased technical change emerged and which forces drive technical
progress and in what direction. As remarked very early in the discussion
by Joan Robinson (1962), technical progress does not fall from heaven like
manna. Technical progress must be produced. This then leads us to the
theory of induced technical progress (cf. for a traditional view Eisen,
1974, and for a modern version Acemoglu, 1998).
This idea of induced skill-biased technical progress is highly
interesting, however, there seems to be a “chicken-egg” problem: goes
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the direction from the Schumpeterian entrepreneur via induced technical
progress to wages or from some macroeconomic causes down to technical
progress and then wages or are wages determined on different grounds?10
In other words: If it is the individual decision of entrepreneurs to spend
money on (induced) technical progress to save costs (with respect to the
more expensive production factor), then this would lead not to a global
pattern which we can observe in the data. Individual entrepreneurs have
different time horizons, different preferences, and differing costs.
Therefore, one would expect actions at various times and the observed
pattern should be stochastic or random.11 Unless all countries, industries
and entrepreneurs are hit almost at the same time by the same macro-
economic shocks!
A superficial look at some date reveals the following picture (cf.
e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000): while the labour share in GDP increases
in the 1960s and until the mid-1970s, it declined dramatically since then
(cf. ibid, Fig.4, p.C8). Labour demand shows little increment up to 1970,
then increases up to 1980 and shows a strong decrease thereafter (ibid, p.
C9). The change in the inflation rate is positive in the 1960s and until
mid-1970s, however, is negative since then (ibid, Fig. 6, p. C11).
Furthermore, while real interest rates were decreasing until the mid-1970s,
since then they were increasing (ibid, Fig. 3, p. C7). And, most important,
“(s)tarting in the early 1970s, Europe suffered a large decrease in the
underlying rate of total factor productivity … growth” (ibid, p. C4 and Fig.
2, p. C5).
These data suggest, contrary to the theory of induced skill-biased
technical progress, a pattern of macro-determination, where the different
national experiences can be explained by the different positions of
countries “in a nonlinear structure” (Conceiçao and Galbraith, 2001, p.
156). Or in other words, there seems to be a global pattern, starting in 1973
through 1980, the years of the first oil shock and the global increase of
commercial debt inaugurating high economic growth and a decline of income
inequality. Then from 1981 up to the end of the century, the second oil
shock, Reagonomics and Thatcherism or the so called “neoliberal
globalization”, the years of debt crisis, the communist collapse, all
together a profound change of the global economic system – and
inequality of income within and between countries increased. However,
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10. There is a further problem, remarked by Thurow (1998), that, while the wage gap between
high school and college graduates increased, real wages in both groups declined!.
11. This means that (the logarithm of) total factor productivity should follow a random walk.
the effects of these global forces (oil price increases, interest rate increases,
FDI etc.) depend on the differing circumstances of the countries.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The idea of the “u-shaped hypothesis” postulated by Kuznets
more than a half century ago, is a macroeconomic explanation, relating the
process of inter-sectoral transition from agriculture (the traditional sector)
to industry (the modern sector) with the evolution of economic inequality.
Here it is shown that this hypothesis follows in a simple two goods two
sector model of growth based on the Harris-Todaro (1970) model of
migration. This is summarized in Hypothesis 1.
Introducing technical progress into the modern sector can lead to a
different picture where the increase in inequality never stops. Examples of
those countries introducing new technologies are Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. However, if one is interested in the
development of “pay inequality” –which lies at the bottom of the Kuznets
hypothesis as developed here– one observes “a substantial increase in
earnings inequality in several OECD countries during the past twenty
years” (as stated by Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999, p. 1632/3).
One strand of theory (e. g. Tinbergen’s “race”) explains this by relative
shifts of demand and supply of different grades of labour, governed by
trade and technical progress. This is summarized in Hypothesis 2.
Following this line of argument further leads to the theory of induced skill-
biased technical change.
Given this microeconomic view, one would expect that total
factor productivity should follow a random walk. However, global data
reveal a “global pattern”. This may lead to another strand of theory,
namely macroeconomics, thus stressing the macroeconomic background
of Kuznets’ explanation: Global changes happened in 1973 and in 1980/81
first decreasing and then increasing inequality within and between countries.
This may best be summarized in Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: Globalization, trade liberalization and (induced) technical
progress decrease inequality as long as they lead to high economic growth.
However, globalization may be blamed for leaving many nations and
millions of people out from reaping the benefits of globalization. This problem,
however, can only be overcome by appropriate reforms of the international
economic and financial system.12
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12. Cf. Stiglitz (2002).
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